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1. Farm progress in the pre-industrial era 
 
Agriculture’s importance for welfare and food security has always provoked government 
intervention. However, the nature of this has undergone profound changes and may change again 
in the future. In pre-industrial societies, governments taxed rather than supported their farmers 
(Olson 1985). Apart from large infrastructural projects, they did little to encourage farm progress. 
The ‘agricultural revolutions’ through which these societies went – from slash-and-burn systems 
to sophisticated rotations with zero fallow (Mazoyer & Roudart 1997) – followed from private 
activities by farmers and landowners. 
 These agricultural revolutions had various drivers and conditions – population growth, 
environmental change, the previous exploration of technical options – and involved changes in 
social structures that stimulated or hampered further development (Johnson & Earle 2000; 
Schutkowski 2006; Wood 1998). However, an important condition that allowed agricultural 
revolutions in pre-industrial market economies to occur was Ricardo’s law that, given the dearth 
of fertilizer and the costliness of transport, population growth raised agricultural prices and 
cheapened farm labour (Ricardo 1817).1 It stimulated larger farmers to intensify, to innovate, and 
to expand their share in production. It also created rural markets for commerce and industries and 
generally enhanced market exchange, which accelerated the diffusion of innovations. 
 In this way, agricultural revolutions were possible even when government policies were 
not especially ‘enabling’. To be sure, because knowledge infrastructure was little developed and 
high risks enhanced the weight of tradition, collective learning was a slow process. Sooner or 
later, an agricultural revolution exhausted the cognitive and institutional capabilities of a society. 
Then food prices skyrocketed, squeezing the demand for non-farm products, making unemployed 
artisans swell the ranks of small farmers, and inducing the latter to over-exploit their plots in an 
effort to minimize their dependence on food markets (cf. Meuvret 1946). Society was pushed into 
a Malthusian spiral of soil degradation, food insecurity and disruption that ended in demographic 
stagnation or collapse. This drove food prices down and raised wages, temporarily reversing the 
process of intensification – until a new demographic upswing initiated a new cycle.2 
 
 
2. Global industrialization and the need for “enabling farm policies” 
 
The Industrial Revolution did not immediately break this Malthusian regime. Its textile factories 
and horse-drawn transport stimulated the demand rather than the supply of farm products, 
                                                 
1 See Shiel (1991) for a good explanation of the difficulty to raise yields in the pre-fertilizer era. 
2 See Abel (1978), Grigg (1980) and Slicher van Bath (1963) for long-term fluctuations in pre-industrial market 
economies. 
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reinforcing the effect of population growth on agricultural markets. Between 1775 and 1875, 
agricultural prices remained high, farm wages were low, and larger farms kept the lead in farm 
progress. Farm innovations remained a product of practical entrepreneurs in and around farming 
(Koning 1994). Leading soil chemist Liebig urged a division between farm practice and 
agricultural science, but his message was precocious (Schling-Brodersen 1989)3 and a prominent 
research station like Rothamsted (UK) remained close to practical farm entrepreneurship (Sykes 
1981). Agriculture became the focus of the ascending economic liberal model. Common lands 
were divided, property rights commercialized, government bodies privatized, and tollhouses 
abolished. The repeal of the British Corn Laws (1846) heralded a worldwide liberalization of 
agricultural trade. In Britain, it stabilized agricultural prices without entailing a price decline. It 
did not hamper the Victorian ‘high farming’ revolution – the beginning of external input 
agriculture still in a framework of large farms (Crosby 1977; Moore 1965). 
All this changed when a new phase of the Industrial Revolution broke the Ricardian 
connection between population and prices (Schultz 1945; Koning 1994). From the later 19th 
century, cheap transport and industrial fertiliser boosted global farm supply; electricity, industrial 
chemistry, and internal combustion caused minerals to replace farm-produced materials; and 
industrial competition in agricultural labour markets strongly increased. It led to falls in 
agricultural prices and rises in farm wages that caused a squeeze on farm profits (see Figures 1 
and 2 for illustration). Limited economies of size hampered a correcting shake out of small farms. 
While low profits eroded the technical lead of large farms, rising wages reinforced the advantage 
that small farms derived from cheap family labour. As a consequence, the share of the latter in 
agricultural production increased (Dovring 1965; Smith 1970). Rather than leaving a sector with 
low earnings, smallholder households tightened their belts and seized upon the new technical and 
market opportunities to defend their incomes by raising production – initiating a treadmill by 
which their incomes were permanently depressed (Cochrane 1959).4 In a free market, a balance 
between the growth in supply and that in demand was only achieved when this treadmill squeezed 
its own fuel supply by reducing farm profits and thereby investment. Rather than to the efficient 
equilibrium of the standard economic model, it led to crowding and slowdown of farm progress.   
These developments induced profound policy changes in western countries (Koning 
1994; Tracy 1989). Liberal land reform gave way to redistributive measures that streamlined the 
shift from large farms to family farms. Government sponsored experiment stations, farm schools 
and extension agents took over the role of large farmers and landowners as initiators of 
innovation. Moreover, governments intervened to moderate the fall in agricultural prices. These 
responses followed diverging pathways in different countries. Redistributive land reform went 
much further in some countries than in other ones, and the time in which they introduced 
agricultural development policies and protection differed. 
In the late 19th century, most West European countries resorted to protection to shield 
their farmers from the fall in international agricultural prices. Other western countries still kept to 
agricultural free trade in this period. Most of them had special advantages in the farm sector. 
Rather than resorting to protection, many of them introduced policies to encourage innovations. 
Thus in the United States, the Hatch Act of 1887 laid the base for the agricultural experiment 
                                                 
3 This was also shown by his own failure to produce effective fertilizers. 
4 Various conditions explain why small farmers do not easily leave agriculture. In an early phase of development, a 
squeeze on farm earnings that hinders investment in agriculture also hampers the increase in industrial jobs, locking a 
large part of the population into rural poverty. Once industrialisation has been initiated, many people will still be tied to 
the land. Imperfect information makes it rational for industrial employers to pay higher than market-clearing wages 
(‘efficiency wages’) to secure the loyal dedication of workers (Akerlof and Yellen 1986). This causes obstacles such as 
unemployment for farm workers who want to change jobs. In addition, a profit squeeze may drive out larger farm 
entrepreneurs, leaving agriculture to household producers, who are less mobile than hired workers (Koning 1994). 
Social-psychological adaptation also plays a role. For instance, Haagsma and Koning (2002) show how temporary 
transition barriers (like temporary mass unemployment) may provoke occupational preference norms that become self-
reinforcing. 
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stations while the Morrill Act of 1890 greatly expanded the funding of the land grant colleges 
(Rossiter 1979). In the Netherlands, the establishment of a State Commission on Agriculture in 
1886 heralded the establishment of experiment stations, extension services and public farm 
schools (Directie van den Landbouw 1907). Both countries weathered the price fall, and when 
international prices recovered after 1900, dynamic agricultural development resumed.  
 
Figure 1. Real wheat prices (5-year moving average) and farm wages, 
England and Wales, 1818=100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Mitchell (1975, pp. 191-5, 736; 1990, 
pp. 737-41, 756-7) 
 
 
Figure 2. Real wheat prices (5-year moving average) and farm wages, 
 United States, 1818=100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Mitchell (1993, pp. 129-30; 696-8) and 
US Bureau of the Census (1976, pp. 207-9)  
 
Recent farm policy discussions have generated a new interest in this episode. Agricultural 
economists like Tracy (1989) have suggested that all western countries could have adjusted their 
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agriculture in a free market, e.g. by shifting to livestock products which were more price-elastic 
than staples like grains. However, international markets for livestock products were soon 
overstocked by a few well-placed countries like Denmark and the Netherlands (Bairoch 1976). A 
few years after the fall in grain prices, livestock prices likewise declined. The free market 
adjustment thesis is also contradicted by the British experience. At the onset of the price fall 
around 1880, Britain possessed the most technically advanced agriculture in the world. However, 
industrial competition for labour had raised farm wages and the country no longer had a 
comparative advantage in agriculture. Nevertheless, until 1930, commercial interests and trade 
unions blocked a protectionist response. According to standard economic theory, free market 
adjustment might have involved a strong reduction, or even total elimination of agriculture, but if 
a farm sector managed to survive to some extent it would see a recovery of profits and 
productivity growth. In reality, farm profits remained low and productivity stagnated throughout 
this period (Koning 1994; van Zanden 1991; Wade 1981). This was not due to a technological 
ceiling, but to widespread disinvestment (Ó Gráda 1981; Offer 1989). Indeed, British agriculture 
fell far behind the European productivity frontier during this period (van Zanden 1991).  
Supporters of the free market adjustment thesis have highlighted the negative effects of 
agricultural protection, especially in Germany (e.g. Gerschenkron 1966; Puhle 1986; Tracy 
1989). Indeed, in a static analysis, agricultural protection caused deadweight losses and reduced 
the buying power of non-farm groups. However, a dynamic approach shows up matters in a 
different light. Productivity growth in German agriculture was among the highest in Europe 
(Helling 1966; Perkins 1981; Van Zanden 1991). Agricultural protection probably accelerated 
overall growth, allocational distortions being offset by an increase in effective demand (Bairoch 
1976). Thereby, and because agriculture was relatively labour-intensive, the policy most likely 
raised real wages.5 Overall, the domestic effects of agricultural protection seem to have been quite 
favourable (see also Webb 1978). To be sure, protection alone did not enable farm progress. In 
France and Italy, where tenure relations gave little security to small farmers and where 
agricultural research and education lagged far behind those in Germany, productivity growth in 
farming was sluggish in spite of protection (Figure 3).6  
A second fall of international agricultural prices around 1930 made all western countries 
resort to protection. By then, all of them had also engaged in government support of farm 
research, education and infrastructural programs, so that in these respects there was a policy 
convergence. The post-WWII years saw a further development of this constellation, aided by the 
general shift to social-Keynesian policies by which western countries responded to the traumatic 
experience of the 1930s and the communist challenge. Denmark and the United States briefly 
tried to return to free market policies in the 1950s, but these experiments were short lived and the 
outcomes disappointing (Cochrane & Ryan 1976; Koning 1986 and literature referred to). After 
1984, New Zealand abandoned protection. The adjustment was hailed as a success because it was 
followed by an increase in productivity growth (e.g. Federated Farmers 2002; Kalaitzandonakis 
1994; Sandrey and Reynolds 1990). However, this increase was limited to horticulture and may 
have been due to pre-liberalization investments (Philpott 1994). In the livestock sector, 
productivity growth remained unaltered in spite of the massive release of marginal resources 
(ibid.; Lawrence and Diewert 1999; also cf. Cloke 1996; Gibson et al. 1994). It should be 
remarked that New Zealand has especially favourable conditions for dairy and horticulture. Its 
                                                 
5 In any case, the negative effect on the costs of living of working-class households has been strongly overrated 
(Hentschel 1978). Something similar is true for the supposed harm to small livestock farmers Henning 1987, Moeller 
1981, Webb 1982). Livestock production was not less protected than grain and grain tariffs did not drive up feed costs. 
Livestock was fed with fodder produced on the farm and with feedstuffs such as oil cakes, which were imported duty-
free. 
6 Nevertheless, the protection of agriculture seems to have sustained the demand for industrial products (Bairoch 1976). 
This was important, because French and Italian industries were more dependent on the domestic market than their 
British counterpart, which as the ‘first workplace of the world’ had gained an established position in the world market. 
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production costs in dairy farming are only half those in other prominent dairy countries like the 
US, Denmark or the Netherlands (IFCN 2007). Moreover, the country benefited from the 
simultaneous introduction of the milk quota system in the EU, which reduced the share in the 
world dairy market of the latter from one-half to one-third. The New Zealand experience cannot 
be generalized, but was the exception that confirmed the rule. 
 
 
Figure 3. The growth of agricultural productivity per head and per hectare in eight 
countries of Western Europe, 1870-1910 (in wheat units and 1870 prices) 
 
 
 
    Source: Van Zanden (1991). 
 
The introduction of price and development policies in western countries paved the way for a new 
agricultural revolution based on high yielding seeds, agri-chemicals and mechanization. Family 
farms rather than large farms were at the core of this revolution, and the increase in productivity 
was fastest where they had a strong position. The evolution of techniques and institutions adapted 
itself to family farms. Agricultural machinery was down-scaled,7 and scale-sensitive activities 
like brewing or cheese making were separated from primary agriculture. Agricultural co-
operatives emerged as an interface that reduced transaction costs in the relations between family 
farmers and their buyers and sellers.8  
The new model of agricultural development was only possible because government 
intervention overcame the risk-aversion of family farmers and their disadvantages in fields like 
information and consolidation, and mitigated the profit squeeze so that the frugality of family 
farmers left some margins for investment. Corporatist structures of negotiation and co-operation 
between government bodies and farmer organizations emerged to regulate state intervention in a 
small-scaled farming sector (Koning 1994). The combination of scientific research and family 
farmers also required some ‘democratic’ interface for being effective. The participatory county 
agent approach pioneered in the US in the early 20th century (Scott 1970) became the prototype 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Sahal (1981) and Williams (1987) for the tractor, or Hupfauer (1969) for the milking machine.  
8 It is striking that, from the end of the 19th century, agricultural cooperatives mushroomed in many western countries, 
while before then they hardly existed (Smith 1961). 
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for extension services in the western world, foreshadowing participatory approaches like farmer 
field schools that are now used in developing countries.  
 
 
3. Diverging responses in the developing world 
 
East and South Asia 
The regime change that emanated from the ‘western’ world deeply affected other countries too, 
but the impacts varied depending on local conditions. In the pre-WWII Japanese Empire (which 
included Korea and Taiwan), the government stimulated farm progress, invested in irrigation and 
rural infrastructure, and protected its farmers at the outer border. It enabled significant rises in 
yields – even though these were moderated by rural inequality and the insecure position of small 
tenants – and made rural incomes an important demand factor for industries that produced simple 
goods for domestic consumption (Francks et al. 1999; Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1961; Ohkawa and 
Shinohara 1979). In post-war Japan, Korea and Taiwan, farmers benefited from redistributive 
land reforms and massive US aid, while high world market prices made negative protection less 
of a problem. After the Korean War, however, prices declined. Agricultural development in South 
Korea and Taiwan stagnated, entailing a slowdown of industrial growth. In both countries the 
government responded by stimulating industrial exports, but the recovery of industrial growth 
owed as much to a new rise in rural incomes. In Taiwan, this was due to large amounts of 
American aid being invested into agricultural infrastructure, research and extension (Thorbecke 
1979), while in South Korea, it was also due to fertilizer subsidies, new import barriers, and a 
strong increase in rice prices paid by the government (Francks et al. 1999). When around 1970, 
agricultural growth slowed once more, both countries provided increasing protection to their 
farmers (Ban et al. 1980; Francks et al. 1999; Moon & Kang 1991).  
Like that in Germany before WWI, agricultural protection in South Korea and Taiwan 
has been blamed for freezing farming structures, retarding economic growth, and harming poor 
consumers (e.g. Anderson et al. 1986; Beghin et al. 2003; Diao et al. 2002; ERS-USDA 2002; 
Vincent 1989). These contentions are backed by standard equilibrium models, but the ‘welfare 
losses’ indicated by such models say nothing about how farm productivity, poverty or GDP 
would have evolved over time had farmers not been protected. Especially Taiwan is a paragon of 
successful agricultural diversification. In both countries, the increase in agricultural protection 
after 1970 was followed by new increases in farm output and incomes, and may well have caused 
the continuation of agriculture’s contribution to the domestic demand pull for industrial growth, 
even if the relative importance of this contribution declined (Francks et al. 1999; Park & Johnston 
1995; also cf. Timmer 1995).9 
While farmers in Japan, Korea and Taiwan were protected, those in Asian colonies of 
European countries were not. Low world market prices prevented population growth from raising 
agricultural prices, discouraging the farmer investment in sustainable land management on which 
earlier agricultural revolutions had been based. Studies like Geertz’ Agricultural involution 
                                                 
9 The discussion on agricultural protection is related to that on industrial trade policies. Whereas advocates of 
‘industrial policy’ point to the importance of infant-industry protection in the successful industrialization of the two 
countries (Amsden 1989; Rodrik 1994; Wade 1990), proponents of open-market regimes emphasize the encouragement 
of industrial exports that facilitated the acquisition of modern technology and skills (Berg and Krueger 2003; World 
Bank 1993)9. However, the precise relations between trade policies, exports and growth are far from clear (Edwards 
1993). This leaves room for the hypothesis that agricultural protection, infant-industry protection and the 
encouragement of industrial exports have reinforced each other rather than conflicting with each other. Agricultural 
protection maintained the farm contribution to the domestic demand pull for industrialization. Domestic protection of 
industry prevented this effect from leaking away to other countries through increases in manufactured imports. Both 
together stimulated industrial growth, which facilitated the cross-subsidization of industrial exports as long as this was 
still needed to conquer the international markets. In this way, agricultural (and industrial) protection may well have 
contributed to the advantages of industrial exports that proponents of pro-market policies have emphasized. 
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(1963) and Myrdal’s Asian Drama (1968) highlighted the consequences. Rural societies were 
pushed in vicious spirals of poverty, population growth and/or resource degradation that 
suffocated economic development. This reminded of Malthusian crises like those in Europe in the 
14th and 17th centuries. However, while these occurred because an agricultural revolution was 
exhausted, here an agricultural revolution was nipped in the bud. 
Independence was a historical watershed. Several new governments introduced 
supportive farm policies (Dawe 2001; Dorward et al. 2001; Kajisa & Akiyama 2005; Timmer 
2002). At the same time, western governments started to export their new model of family farm 
based development stimulated by redistributive land reform, co-operatives and government 
sponsored research and extension. This was coupled to a growing flow of development aid, 
stimulated by the Cold War competition between the western and communist blocks. Part of this 
movement was the establishment of international agricultural research institutes like IRRI and 
CYMMIT that engaged in spreading the high-yielding seed revolution that had started with 
hybrid maize in the United States in the 1920s. The synergy of supportive national policies and 
high-yielding seeds from international research institutions led to the Green Revolution, which 
became an engine of industrialization. In China and Vietnam, a similar evolution became possible 
by the relaxation of policies that taxed agriculture for the sake of forced industrialization.10 The 
Green Revolution has been criticized for its negative side effects. Indeed, increased use of agri-
chemicals caused polluting emissions and quite some smaller farmers were displaced because 
they could not afford to buy the required package of purchased inputs. In themselves, these 
effects were similar to those of agricultural modernization in western countries, but in a setting 
where lack of entitlements was still a main cause of undernourishment, they could endanger 
rather than improve the food security of rural households that lost their means of existence. 
Nevertheless, there is no denial that the main effect of the Green Revolution on food security has 
been positive. By its domestic demand effect and other linkage effects, it became an engine of 
industrialization, which provided jobs and thereby access to food to those who had left the land. 
Overall, the share of poor and undernourished people in South and especially East Asia has 
strongly decreased. 
That Asian countries choose to support their agriculture was connected to their social-
political structure. They had a long history of population growth, state formation, class 
differentiation and market development. Economic interests tended to organize on class basis, and 
the evolution of states had created a political class with an open eye for long-term interests. This 
political class and open or latent pressure from farmer movements became important pillars of the 
‘developmental states’  (cf. Johnson 1987) that launched the Green Revolution.  
 
Latin America 
In the Americas, pre-Columbian Stone Age societies had been overrun by European invaders with 
superior weapons and diseases for which they had no immunity (Diamond 1998; Mann 2005). In 
the (sub)tropical parts, where profitable export crops could be grown that could not be produced 
in Europe, large plantations evolved that employed coercive labour systems to prevent workers 
from using the abundance of land and setting themselves up as independent peasants. It created a 
social divide between planter elites and rightless masses of rural workers, which encouraged 
‘oligarchic’ political structures, hampered the development of simple consumer goods industries, 
and reinforced the export orientation of the plantations (de Janvry 1981). When international 
agricultural prices fell from the late 19th century, agrarian elites kept to open trade policies (even 
though they engaged in cartelization attempts in coffee and sugar). Rather than calling for 
protection, they used their dominance to shift the burden to the rural poor. In the end, they evicted 
                                                 
10 Of course, there are exceptions and variants to this pattern. In Thailand, abundance of land allowed agricultural 
growth without a Green Revolution (Siamwalla 1995), while in India, the Green Revolution was constrained by rural 
inequality and incomplete land reform (Patnaik 2002).  
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large numbers of rural workers to pave the way for cost-cutting mechanization. This allowed a 
development of a kind, but one that involved more inequality and socio-political tensions than in 
other regions, as well as crowding and resource degradation in poor areas that served as a refuge 
for displaced rural workers. These effects curbed economic growth in the region (Johnston & 
Kilby 1975; World Bank 2005). Land reform and conflicting trade policy interests of large and 
small farmers emerged as vital issues in this setting. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, endemic diseases and iron-armed warriors postponed the colonial 
scramble until the time that international agricultural prices declined. This limited the 
establishment of European-owned farms and plantations, as well as the evolution of larger 
indigenous farms. Africa's agriculture became even more a smallholder agriculture than it already 
was (Bundy 1972; Huijzendveld 1997; Munro 1976). Like in Asia, colonial governments failed to 
protect indigenous smallholder farmers. Relative abundance of land for some time provided an 
outlet for population growth, but this safety valve was gradually closed, and the fall in 
international agricultural prices around 1930 led to widespread alarm about soil degradation 
(Koning & Smaling 2005 and literature referred to). Anti-erosion measures propagated by 
colonial officials went against the strategies by which farmers coped with low prices. Even in 
spite of coercion, therefore, these ‘betterment policies’ had little success (e.g. Mackenzie, 1998; 
Munro, 1975; Tiffen et al. 1994; more generally Koning & Smaling 2005). 
Higher post-war prices induced new investment by smallholder farmers, even though 
colonial governments used marketing boards for taxing farm exports to pay the expenses of their 
development apparatus (Munro 1976). In the 1960s, per capita incomes in Sub-Sahara Africa 
were higher than in Southern Asia. Unlike in Asia, however, national independence brought no 
real breach with colonial farm policies. Sub-Saharan African societies were little differentiated, 
had property rights in people rather than material assets, and had more fluid and personalist socio-
political relations (Bayart 1989; Goody 1976). As a consequence, people tended to organize in 
clientelist factions rather than in class-based farmer movements. Politicians saw themselves 
obliged to remunerate large numbers of supporters with public sector jobs, while farmers were 
too weakly organized to prevent footing the bill (Bates 1981; Djurfeldt et al. 2005). Farmers were 
not protected and public investment in infrastructure for smallholder based development 
remained limited. Export crops were taxed to pay the expenses of an agricultural development 
apparatus that now became populated by African graduates but whose approaches still reminded 
of colonial ‘betterment’ (Bates 1981). The effects were felt when oil shocks raised the costs of 
farm inputs in the 1970s, and even more when international agricultural prices fell once more in 
the 1980s. Unfavourable price ratios and lack of infrastructure limited farmer investment in land 
management, which thereby failed to make the increase in population sustainable. The resulting 
agricultural stagnation became the core of a complex poverty trap. It caused a flight off the land, 
but squeezed the demand for domestic industries and services. As a consequence, the rural exodus 
was not absorbed by non-farm growth, but fueled political markets that were based on the doling 
out of public sector jobs (Koning 2002). State and semi-state bureaucracies increased, but falling 
export earnings and economic stagnation made this expansion bog down into fiscal crisis. Foreign 
lending gave briefly respite, but burdened the region with unsustainable debts. 
There has been no lack of projects that tried to revitalize African agriculture. However, 
the results spread hardly beyond the artificial context of the project. Agronomists and other 
experts are struggling about which approach would be most suited to get agriculture moving – 
high or low external inputs, farmer field schools or training and visit – but the reality is that all 
these approaches have disappointing results (Koning & Smaling 2005; Reardon et al. 1999). Poor 
soils, adverse climates and diversified food patterns with roots and tubers in addition to cereals 
have been pointed to in attempts to explain these poor outcomes. Indeed, an agricultural 
revolution should be more diverse than in Asian circumstances – a ‘Rainbow Evolution’ rather 
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than a Green Revolution (InterAcademy Council 2004). Nevertheless, natural conditions and food 
patterns can hardly explain why, e.g., in many places with fertile volcanic soils and a 
predominance of maize, rural societies are likewise stuck in stagnation. The real explanation of 
the plight of the region is the conjunction of international agricultural overproduction and 
patrimonial socio-political structures. 
 
 
4. Multilateral regulation of agricultural trade? 
 
Countries protect their farmers because international prices are low. Unless combined with supply 
management, however, protection further depresses international prices because it raises domestic 
production exacerbating the oversupply at the global level. The European countries that began 
protecting their farmers in the late 19th century hardly bothered about this. They were food 
importers, and if their policies reduced international prices they could simply raise their tariffs.  
In the 1930s, however, major agricultural exporting countries also resorted to protection. 
Moreover, the Great Depression squeezed the domestic demand for farm products, leaving more 
countries with increasing surpluses. Because shrinking world markets made dumping increasingly 
costly for governments, several countries introduced supply management to reduce their excess 
production. Thus France controlled the production of wheat, the Netherlands that of livestock and 
vegetables, and the US that of cotton and tobacco. These measures soon became linked to 
international trade negotiations. Many policy makers and economists believed that some 
multilateral system of supply management was needed to bring world market prices back to 
desirable levels. The Monetary and Economic Conference of the League of Nations, the US 
Department of Agriculture in the New Deal Period, leading economist Keynes in his blueprint for 
the post-WWII economic order (Keynes 1943), and various UN bodies all advocated international 
commodity controls in one form or another. It led to the first international commodity agreements 
for staples like sugar and wheat, as well as to special provisions in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was concluded after WWII (Chimni 1987; Gordon-Ashworth 
1984; Henningson 1981). In spite of its free trade philosophy, the GATT permitted countries to 
protect their farmers provided that they controlled their production and exports. Besides, 
countries were allowed to engage in international commodity agreements to stabilize and support 
primary commodity prices if needed.  
Nevertheless, a balanced multilateral system of managed trade did not emerge. 
Negotiations on international agreements for tropical crops were troubled because producer 
countries disagreed on quotas and consuming countries resisted anything beyond short-term price 
stabilization. Only a few control agreements were concluded. There were many challenges, but 
the main cause was rules that tilted the balance of power to importing countries and raised the 
costs of negotiating agreements. Agreements could only be negotiated on a commodity-by-
commodity basis; their life time was bound to a 5 year limit; and they had to be approved by 
concurrent majorities of producing countries and consuming countries (Chimni 1987; Koning et 
al. 2004; Maizels 2002). In practice, this gave a veto to a few unwilling importing countries. In 
the 1970s, developing countries sought to redress this situation. They adopted a number of 
resolutions in the UN General Assembly and used UNCTAD to launch an Integrated Program for 
Commodities that envisaged the conclusion of 17 commodity agreements that were to be financed 
by a Common Fund for Commodities. Developed countries did not dare to withhold their 
signatures from this program, but they thwarted its implementation and let the few existing 
arrangements collapse in the 1980s (Chimni 1987; Gilbert 1996; Maizels 2002).11 Many 
economists see this history as proof that free rider and rent seeking problems make international 
commodity controls inherently unsustainable (e.g. Bohman et al. 1996; Herrmann 1986; Lal 
                                                 
11 Except the agreement for natural rubber which lasted until 1999.  
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1985). The evidence for this viewpoint is thin. Not only had few controls been introduced, but the 
resistance of importing countries to anything beyond short term price stabilization restricted the 
instruments to buffer stocks and export retention, which were not able to correct the supply for a 
longer period. 
Meanwhile, the coupling of protection to production and export controls as intended by 
the GATT was thwarted by the expansionist policies of the US and the EU. Both blocks allowed 
their protectionist policies to entail import substitution and dumping (partly disguised as food 
aid). Around 1980, it caused a trade conflict between them. This was aggravated by growing US 
trade balance deficits and because the EU was free riding on the American acreage control 
program while the US was using the ‘Rotterdam loophole’ for dumping corn gluten on the 
European feed market (van den Noort 1995).12 The American government responded strategically 
by lowering its direct subsidization of farm exports and compensating farmers through price 
subsidies. On this base it could form a coalition with the ‘Cairns group’ of agricultural exporting 
countries that demanded the elimination of all export subsidies and import restrictions in the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In 1993, a compromise between the US and the EU led to 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture that prescribed reductions in price support measures but 
exempted certain forms of direct payments. In the following years, both powers increasingly 
replaced their price supports with such payments. Other countries could not follow this approach 
because of the high government cost involved, so that the obligatory reduction in price supports 
entailed a reduction in the support to their farmers. The Agreement on Agriculture gave 
developing countries some leeway for maintaining price supports. However, the US, the EU, the 
World Bank and the IMF have pressured them (in bilateral trade negotiations and negotiations on 
financial support) not to use this room.13 These developments were surrounded by a discourse 
which depicted this evolution as ‘trade liberalization’, harking back to realities of the mid-19th 
century. This reflected the shift from Keynesian to liberal-deflationary policies in global politics 
that was inaugurated by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the US and the UK (Monthly 
Review 1999). Model studies which showed that agricultural trade liberalization would bring 
‘welfare benefits’, but that ignored the dynamics of agricultural markets and developing 
countries, played an important role in this discourse (e.g. Anderson & Martin 2005; see FAO 
2006 for criticism on these models). Meanwhile the income support given to OECD farmers has 
hardly decreased. While other countries are obliged to reduce their customs defenses, direct 
payments allow the US and the EU to continue exporting large volumes for prices below their 
own cost of production (Ray et al. 2003).  
 
 
5. Changes and continuity 
 
The reform of agricultural trade policies were part of a broader movement of farm policy 
liberalization. In addition to reductions in price supports, this also involved a dismantling of 
parastatals in developing countries, and a general shift from public to private agricultural research 
that was coupled to a strengthening of intellectual property rights (Pardey et al. 2006). These 
policy changes coincide with private sector changes. Until the 1980s, agri-food markets were 
mainly marked by chain differentiation, price competition and an increasing standardization of 
products. However, this pattern has been altering since under the influence of forces such as 
increased concentration in agro-industries and retailing, financial needs of highly capitalized 
farms, improved logistics, demand saturation, and ever stricter food safety requirements. These 
forces stimulate product differentiation and a new vertical coordination within agro-industrial 
                                                 
12 The ‘Rotterdam loophole’ was a loophole in the European system of agricultural import protection that was caused 
by the EU’s commitment in the Dillon Round (1961-62) to allow free access to oilseeds and protein crops. 
13 This practice is still defended in the new World Development Report (World Bank 2007). 
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chains that involves more buyer and seller interference with farm management (Barkema et al. 
1993). Product differentiation also creates niches for new artisanal (including “organic” or “fair 
trade”) products, but that has remained a side effect.  
Against these changes there is a vital continuity (Koning 1995). World agriculture is still 
marked by overproduction and a squeeze on farm profits. Claims by liberal economists that the 
problem of low farm earnings has ceased to exist (e.g. Gardner 1992; Hill 1996; OECD 2002) are 
based on data on total incomes of farm households that include income supports and do not 
measure the gap in factor returns between farming and non-farming. Although this gap tends to 
diminish as farmer communities become more strongly culturally integrated in urbanizing 
societies (Haagsma & Koning 2005), the level of per capita GDP at which this occurs has 
increased rather than decreased over last decades (Timmer 2007). 
New agro-industrial developments interact with the secular overproduction dynamics of 
agricultural markets. The increased market power of traders and processors causes farm-gate 
prices and final-consumer prices to diverge in various cases (e.g. Gouin 2007). Together with the 
loss of room for manoeuvre that quasi-integration involves for farmers, it reinforces the treadmill 
mechanism that generates overproduction. In its turn, overproduction weakens the market power 
of farmers against traders and processors, so that the two mechanisms become mutually 
reinforcing. 
Rather than the alleged superior power of agrarian pressure groups that is blamed by 
liberal economists (e.g. Schmitt 1984; Senior Nello 1984; Tracy 1989; World Bank 2007),14 the 
continued squeeze on farm profits explains why, in spite of the liberal rhetoric, developed 
countries go on with supporting farm incomes. It also explains why the new chain coordination 
takes the form of a quasi-integration of agricultural production units of which the ownership is 
left with self-employed farmers. Real integration would allow lower production and transaction 
costs, but would saddle traders and processors with the low profitability of primary agriculture. 
Although the recent changes have not ended the secular overproduction dynamics of 
agricultural markets to which public and private actors have to respond, they do have important 
effects. Demands of chain integrators are creating new thresholds for farm producers. This is even 
true for organic or fair trade chains, where high certification costs complicate the participation of 
resource-poor farmers (Clay et al. 2005). 
Dismantling of price policies will entail increases in short-term price volatility, which 
will affect investment (Gérard et al. 2003; Boussard et al. 2006). Regrettably, no allowances have 
been made for such effects in the welfare-economic studies of agricultural trade liberalization that 
established institutions have made.  
Liberal reforms have different effects in the developing world. Several successful Asian 
countries have become less dependent on farming and can moderate agricultural protection 
without endangering their economies (Dawe 2007). In Latin America, liberal-economic macro-
policies and repression of popular opposition paved the way for new export-led growth based on 
large farms. In some cases, this generated new employment (see e.g. Anríquez & López 2007 for 
horticulture in Chile), but in other cases, it created few additional job opportunities (see e.g. De 
Ferranti et al. 2005 for Brazil). In many places, low prices have driven many small farmers in 
illegal crops like coca, or turned them into new slum dwellers or illegal immigrants in the United 
States. Besides, the wild capitalism of the latifundio sector and the desperation of marginalized 
rural workers cause a scramble for fragile natural resources, leading to large-scale deforestation 
and depletion. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the debt crisis allowed western donors to impose trade 
liberalization and reductions in government expenses. The latter were realized, first by cuts on 
public services, then by reductions in public sector wages, and only in the last place by public 
                                                 
14 This idea is rooted in a false interpretation of Mancur Olson, who really pointed to the late development of agrarian 
countervailing power against urban power (see Olson 1985). 
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sector retrenchment. Farmers suffered from competition by cheap imports and the neglect of 
roads and other public services. This only aggravated the agricultural crisis and the ensuing 
poverty trap in which the region was caught. It made access to and control over the public sector 
even more important for ambitious individuals, which aggravated the predatory tendencies in 
regional politics. Indeed, the “bad governance” bogey on which international donors are blaming 
the failure of their liberal prescriptions is partly of their own making.  
Finally, the shift from public to private agricultural research is narrowing the room for 
agricultural development in less-favoured areas (Pingali 2007). Unlike the Green Revolution, the 
new Gene Revolution is led by corporations whose research agenda is guided by effective 
demand. It leads to massive investment in e.g. herbicide tolerance but to underinvestment in the 
drought resistance that is vital for millions of poor farmers in less-favoured dryland areas. 
Developing countries cannot easily compensate this through national research policies. While the 
germplasm of Green Revolution institutes like IRRI and CYMMIT was freely available for 
national researchers, the germplasm produced by private corporations is only available for those 
who are willing to pay the price. 
 
 
6. Long term global food availability: continued abundance or new scarcity? 
 
That agricultural markets are still marked overproduction, does not exclude a shift in the secular 
trend towards new scarcity in the future. Between now and mid-century, world population is 
expected to grow from 6.5 to 9 billion (United Nations 2005). Rising incomes in successful 
developing countries will boost the consumption of animal products, the global demand of which 
is expected to double (Steinfeld et al. 2006). Moreover, the use of biomass for new non-foods – 
especially functionalized chemicals – will strongly increase.15 Together, these developments can 
easily lead to a tripling of the global demand for biomass. 
 There is no guarantee that this new increase in demand can be met effortlessly. To be 
sure, significant increases in farm output are still possible in many areas. Straightforward fertility 
measures, water-saving measures and pest management techniques would allow considerable 
yield increases in many dryland areas. Water-use efficiency in many irrigated systems could 
easily be doubled (Tuong et al. 2005). Simple storage and processing measures would reduce 
post-harvest losses and allow better residue use. And improved livestock systems could raise low 
feed ratios in developing countries (Wirsenius 2003). Nevertheless, the plentiful space for 
reclaiming new fertile lands, tapping water reserves for irrigation, and boosting yields through 
agro-chemicals and growth-resistant varieties on which the rapid increase in farm output in the 
20th century was based, are gradually being depleted. Only a few countries in South America and 
in Africa retain significant reserves of good lands (Fischer et al. 2001). Water is becoming 
increasingly limiting (Rosegrant et al. 2002). Mineral phosphate may become scarce (IFA/UNEP 
1998; Smil 1999). And further increases in the yields of commercial staples are proving difficult 
to achieve (Bindraban 1997; Cassman et al. 2003).  
From a purely technical viewpoint, the current global potential for farm production seems 
still to be adequate (Penning de Vries et al. 2005; Wolf et al. 2003). However, more than 80 
percent of the technical reserves are situated in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and transition 
countries, where their exploitation is complicated by institutional problems. Environmental 
constraints and technical complexities – e.g. of controlling pests and diseases – also hinder a full 
exploitation of the existing potential.16 In any case, a more far-reaching exploitation of this 
potential will involve significant increases in costs for irrigation and fertilization (Koning et al., 
                                                 
15 Biofuel and bioheat are much less efficient applications of biomass than functionalized chemicals (see Sanders et al. 
2007). 
16 Even in Europe a quarter of crop production is still lost due to pests and diseases (Oerke et al. 1995). 
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forthcoming).  
The potential for biomass production could be stretched by technical breakthroughs that 
would raise the light or nutrient use efficiency of plants (e.g. Long et al. 2006)17 or by the 
development of new non-farm production systems based on e.g. seaweeds or algae (Reith et al. 
2005; Spolaore et al. 2006). Alternatively, breakthroughs in biorefinement could increase the 
efficiency by which biomass is converted into foods or non-food products (Ragauskas et al. 2006; 
Sanders et al. 2007). However, investment in such technologies involves long gestation periods. 
The same is true for other investments that determine future production capacities, for instance in 
human capital or the regeneration of degraded soils. To avoid unnecessary scarcity, such 
investments should be taken in time. However, with myopic expectations and financially 
constrained farmers, low current prices can restrict the size of these investments. If, after some 
time, it were to become more difficult for the global supply of food to keep up with demand, this 
could lead to soaring food prices, wreaking havoc in net food importing poor countries. Such 
cobweb (‘pig cycle’) effects might be exacerbated if government support for agriculture were to 
be strongly reduced in a final phase of international overabundance (Koning et al., forthcoming). 
In this sense, the present dismantling of price supports, the continuance of disguised dumping by 
developed countries, the phasing out of fertiliser subsidies in developing countries and the 
worldwide reductions in support for farm research might pose serious threats.  
 
 
7. Which agricultural policies will enable global food security and sustainable pro-poor 
growth? 
 
Three main lessons can be drawn out of the above survey. Firstly, under the evolutionary regime 
that has prevailed since the late 19th century, national and multilateral government intervention 
including price and income supports has become indispensable for a balanced development of the 
global agri-food economy. Secondly, different parts of the developing world are involved in 
different dynamic patterns, so that food security and sustainable pro-poor growth in these parts 
may require different types of intervention. Thirdly, it is not sure that the regime of abundant food 
supply at the global level will continue in the coming decades, so that responsible policies will 
have to reckon with the possibility of increased scarcity. These broad considerations can be 
translated in a number of general principles that are important if agricultural policies have to 
enable global food security and sustainable pro-poor growth. 
 
Policies for developing countries: 
• High- and middle-income countries should strongly increase their contribution to the funding 
of public international agricultural research. At the same time the agenda of this research 
should become much more focused on issues which are important for poor farmers and less-
favoured areas but that are being under-researched by private corporations. Drought 
resistance, orphan crops, and light irrigation in rainfed agriculture are likely candidates. 
Private corporations should be required to give access to their germplasm and exceptions to 
intellectual property rights should be made for these purposes. 
• Public investment in roads, irrigation, farm research, extension, rural schools, health centres 
and other hard and soft infrastructures for agricultural progress in poor countries and less-
favoured areas should strongly increase. For example, African countries should realise their 
commitment made in Maputo in 2003 to use at least 10 percent of their budgets for 
agricultural development. This investment should be co-financed by international 
development aid.  
• Where co-ordination problems cause a lack of private investment in supply and marketing 
                                                 
17 See however Yin & Struik (2007) on over-optimistic expectations of the authors. 
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chains for agricultural development in less-favoured areas, government participation can be 
needed to get things moving. This can mean that governments have to step back into some 
activities from which they have withdrawn in the frame of structural adjustment reform. 
However, sufficient room should be maintained for private competition to control 
bureaucratic tendencies, and governments should back out again as soon as private 
alternatives have grown strong enough. 
• Rights of poor tillers should be strengthened to allow them to participate in and benefit from 
agricultural development. The priorities in this strengthening of rights follow from the 
different dynamic patterns in which parts of the developing world are involved. E.g., in Latin 
America with its strong inequalities in landownership, redistributive land reform and 
strengthening the land rights of poor farmers is a prominent issue. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
however, priority may be given to corroborating local justice in ways that strengthen the 
rights of farm youths and women, to whom the burden of rural poverty tends to be shifted in 
gerontocratic structures. In emerging market economies in Asia, in their turn, social security 
regulations for farm workers may be most relevant. 
• Developing countries should have the right to support the incomes of their farmers (also by 
protective tariffs) if this is needed to get their agriculture moving as an engine of growth. 
Additional government revenue that is generated by tariff increases should be used to 
enhance the public investment in hard and soft infrastructure for agricultural development. 
Any tariff increases on food imports should be accompanied by measures to compensate poor 
consumers. Roads building – financed through tariff revenue and international aid – can be 
used as employment projects for this purpose. Another possibility is school meals and other 
institutional meals made from domestic foods. Such measures can also give an important 
additional demand impulse for agricultural growth. Early estimates indicate that home-grown 
school feeding programs could raise the turnover of food crop farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by some 15 percent.  
• Participatory approaches are most suited as an interface between agricultural research and 
extension on the one hand, and smallholder farmers on the other hand. However, it should be 
understood that such approaches will only work when other enabling policy conditions 
(including public investment in infrastructure and supportive price policies) are also fulfilled. 
 
Policies to reduce risks of strong rises in international food prices: 
• Caution is needed in stimulating the demand for biomass for non-food purposes. A moderate 
increase in such demand that would cause some rise in international agricultural prices might 
stimulate agricultural development in poor countries. But a large increase in such demand 
could send international food prices skyrocketing. This could especially occur if government 
policies lead to large-scale production of biofuel. Preferably, the use of biomass for non-food 
should be limited to more efficient applications of biomass like functionalized chemicals. 
Rather than using seeds or tubers, second generation technologies for transforming residues 
and whole plants as could be developed. The conversion efficiency of biomass into chemicals 
could be greatly increased by fine-tuning and bio-refinery.  
• Policies are required that mitigate the increasing claim on farm-produced biomass for animal 
foods for affluent consumers. A shift from beef to pork, poultry or fish would already 
moderate the competition with food for the poor (as well as improve public health). The 
development of more attractive plant-based meat substitutes (e.g. on the basis of fungi rather 
than grains and legumes) could have an even larger effect. Besides, new production systems 
for phytoplankton could moderate the demand for farm-produced feed (and fishmeal, which 
already claims almost half of the world’s fish capture).  
• Where possible nature and biodiversity conservation should be combined with agricultural 
exploitation. Large-scale conversion of agricultural land into nature/biodiversity reserves 
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should happen in ways that make it readily reversible. 
• To reduce the risk that, in the longer term, strong rises in international food prices cause 
havoc in poor net-food-importing countries, high- and middle-income countries should also 
increase their capabilities for agricultural production. Between now and mid-century, the 
global demand for food will double, while a larger share of suitable lands will be claimed for 
non-food purposes. The types of low input agriculture that are currently being developed as 
‘organic’ alternatives for high input agriculture will not be able to meet the rising demand for 
food in the future. Agricultural research should aim at technologies for ecological 
modernization that reduce emissions while increasing land productivity rather than at 
techniques that reduce emissions by decreasing inputs while minimising production losses.  
• Although countries should timely increase their capabilities for food production, they should 
make a restrained use of these capabilities as long as international markets are marked by 
abundant supply. (There is nothing contradictory in this: a reliable car has a strong engine as 
well as a strong brake.) High- and middle-income countries should have the right to support 
the incomes of their farmers to enable a precautionary policy of enhancing production 
capabilities with a view to any future increases in global scarcity, but only if they use these 
capabilities with constraint in order to avoid global overproduction. 
 
Multilateral regulation of agricultural markets and trade: 
• Simple ‘liberalization’ is not a viable concept for a multilateral system of agricultural trade in 
the current situation, and leads to an unbalanced situation of disguised dumping by rich 
countries and customs disarmament of poor countries. 
• A multilateral system of managed trade based is needed to keep international agricultural 
prices within desirable price bands. In tropical export crops this means the establishment of 
international production controls based on export and production controls. In other crops, the 
introduction of supply management should start by imposing disciplines on developed 
countries to correct trade distortions that have been caused by decennia-long policies of 
offensive protection,. E.g., maximum export quotas and minimum import quotas could be 
imposed on developed countries, with quotas based on historical trade volumes and tradable 
between governments. After a transition period, such disciplines could be extended to 
middle-income countries. Low-income countries should be exempted to create room for them 
to increase their production and exports. 
• To prevent the demand of the affluent for animal products and nonfoods to outcompete the 
demand for food for the poor, an international tax on the use of biomass for new nonfoods 
could be introduced that is levied when international prices of food staples exceed a pre-
agreed ceiling. 
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